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Instructions: 
 
1.          Number of pages:  7 pages. 
2. The paper consists of two (2) sections and six (6) questions (three questions per section).  
3. Answer only four (4) questions by choosing two (2) questions from each section. 
4. Each question carries 25 marks.  
5. Noiseless calculators may be used. 
6. Please write neatly and legibly. 
7.  Ambiguous or unsupported answers will not receive full credit. 
 
SECTION A – Answer two (2) of the three (3) questions 
Question 1  
a) Assume that the production of good X produces a marginal private benefit and marginal 
external benefit as given in the functions below:   
MPB = 15 – x 
MEB = 2 
Further assume that the marginal cost of producing good X is fixed at R3. Use this information 
to answer the following questions.  
i. Sketch a graph of the MPB, MEB and MC curves and show both the private market 
equilibrium and the efficient equilibrium.   
ii. Using the above functions, solve for the private market and efficient equilibriums.   
iii. Using the graph, give a brief explanation showing that the move from the private market 
equilibrium to the efficient equilibrium, assuming welfare transfers are possible, is a Pareto 
improvement.   
[15] 
b) Assume that a pig farm is located adjacent to a winery and that the smell from the pig farm 
reduces the number of tourists who choose to stop at the winery. The table below shows the 
number of pigs the farmer can raise, the farmer’s marginal cost for each additional pig, the 
farmer’s marginal benefit and the marginal damage for the winery.  
 
Number of Pigs  Marginal Cost  Marginal Benefit  Marginal Damages  
1  R3  R13  R5  
2  R6  R13  R7  
3  R10  R13  R9  
4  R13  R13  R11  
5  R19  R13  R13  
6  R21  R13  R15  
 
Use this information to answer the following questions.  
i. What is the private optimal for the pig farmer?  
ii. What is the farmer’s optimal number of pigs if the farmer is liable to the winery for 
foregone (or lost) revenue?  
iii. Assume that the farmer has the right to raise as many pigs as they deem optimal. Explain, 
in detail, what the winery owner may do to get the farmer to reduce his/her number of pigs. 
What will be the equilibrium number of pigs on the farm using this process?  
 [10] 
 
 
 
Question 2  
a) Explain and critically apply Nozick’s ‘three principles of justice’ as per his ‘entitlement theory’ to the 
current issue of land redistribution in South Africa. What are the main weaknesses with this 
approach in analysing the issue of land redistribution in the country?  
[25] 
Question 3  
a) Koksal (2008) analysed public expenditure in Turkey using the median voter theory. The 
econometric results are given in Annexure A of this script. Explain the empirical model that was 
estimated, interpret the results and explain how the results confirm or refute the median voter 
theory. 
[15] 
b) Using the necessary graph(s), explain the theory of optimal voting rules. Explain how the optimal 
majority is reached to vote on an issue, why this majority is likely to be different for different issues 
and why it is easier to achieve a majority outcome in homogenous societies.  
[10] 
SECTION B – Answer two (2) of the three (3) questions 
Question 4  
a) Chipaumire et al (2014) tested for the long run impact of government spending on economic growth 
in South Africa. Discuss the theoretical channels that the authors propose to explain such a 
relationship and highlight a potential criticism of their theoretical approach. Suggest a more 
appropriate theory to explain government’s impact on long run economic growth.  
[10] 
b) Chipaumire et al (2014) found a negative impact between government expenditure and long run 
economic growth in South Africa. Provide reasons to explain such a relationship in support of this 
finding. 
[10] 
c) List and explain the five (5) policy challenges highlighted by Triegaardt (2006) that is adversely 
affecting South Africa’s ability to tackle poverty and inequality challenges.   
[5] 
Question 5  
a) Discuss the results found by Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) in Annexure B. How applicable is 
this study to South Africa.       
 [10] 
 
b) Discuss the results found by Kumar and Woo (2010) in Annexure C. 
[10] 
 
c) Explain briefly how they try to check for robustness of their results.  
[5] 
Question 6  
a) Annexure D illustrates the division of revenue between the three spheres of government in South 
Africa. Provide the economic and policy rationale for the division of revenue process in the country.  
  [10]  
b) “The South African fiscal scene has over many decades been characterised by a steady and 
gradual reduction of fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments” (Calitz and Essop, 2012). Do 
you agree with this statement? In answering this question, critically discuss the criteria used by the 
authors to determine the extent of fiscal decentralisation in the country that informed their 
conclusion. Ultimately, would you support a centralised or decentralised fiscal system? 
Substantiate your answer.  
   [15]  
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parameter,7 its expected sign must be positive. Considering the earlier 
studies and assuming that all public goods are not pure then, this 
expectation can be legitimized. 
In estimation with LS method, we use fixed effects specification to 
exploit the richness of the data. Through using fixed effect specification, 
each cross-sectional unit, here each province has its own intercept value. 
Thus, by controlling effectively the cross-section effects, we can deal 
more with the variable of interests. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Fixed Effect Estimation with LS 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.52*** 0.04 -12.42 
Population elasticity 0.55*** 0.06 9.75 
Income elasticity 0.51*** 0.05 10.67 
Elas. of preceding level  0.54*** 0.06 9.40 
R-squared: 0.99            Durbin-Watson stat: 2.11               Number of obs: 474 
 
Before interpreting the results some econometric issues must be 
mentioned about the estimation. First, the results are cross-sectional 
weighted GLS estimates, to allow heteroscedasticity in a relevant 
dimension. Second, to attain robust standard errors we employ White’s 
heteroscedasticity–correction. 
The results are completely consistent with the theoretical model, in 
terms of their significances and their signs. In earlier studies, i.e., 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972), it 
is reported that income elasticities are less than one and price elasticities 
in the range of -0.2 to -0.6. Our results are robust and remain in the 
mentioned intervals. 
However, as mentioned earlier, population elasticity consists of 
price elasticity parameter and the crowding parameter. Considering the 
estimated measures in Table 1, one can calculate the crowding 
parameter as 0.07, approximately. This refers to the characteristic of the 
public goods with a high degree of publicness. In other words, the 
provided goods are almost non-rival, or pure. 
The confirmation of theory across the country motivates us to 
make some additional tests at regional level. In fact, we were curious 
                                                          
 
7 Recall that δδαθ −+= )1(  
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CHAPTER 7: PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
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Table 7.1 summarises the division of revenue for the 2014 Budget, taking into 
account the revenue-raising capacities and spending responsibilities of each 
level of government. 
 
In 2012/13, national expenditure amounted to R965.5 billion (including 
transfers to provinces and municipalities) out of a total adjusted 
appropriation of R971.5 billion. This represents underspending of 
0.6 per cent compared with 1.1 per cent in 2011/12. Provincial government 
underspent its adjusted budget of R402.7 billion for 2012/13 by 
R7.5 billion (1.9 per cent), compared with underspending of R4.9 billion 
(1.3 per cent) in the previous year. Municipalities spent R19.4 billion or 
84.6 per cent, of their infrastructure grants in the 2012/13 municipal 
financial year, up from 78.5 per cent in 2011/12. 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Division of Revenue sets out the 
provincial and municipal allocations, details the equitable share formula 
and explains how the division takes into account the recommendations of 
the Financial and Fiscal Commission. The memorandum is available as 
Annexure W1 of the Budget Review on the National Treasury website 
(www.treasury.gov.za).  
 
 
Table 7.1  Division of nationally raised revenue, 2010/11 – 2016/17
2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17
R million
Outcome  Revised 
estimate 
Medium-term estimates
Division of available funds
National departments 356 027  382 712  412 706  449 251    489 424     522 257     552 983     
  of which: 
Indirect transfers to provinces –            76          860        2 693       5 413        5 044        4 127        
Indirect transfers to local 
government
2 939     2 770     4 956     5 697       7 726        9 467        10 221      
Provinces 322 822  362 488  388 238  414 932    444 423     477 639     508 254     
Equitable share 265 139  291 736  313 016  338 937    362 468     387 967     412 039     
Conditional grants 57 682    70 753    75 222    75 995      81 955       89 672       96 215       
Local government 60 904    68 251    76 430    83 670      90 815       100 047     105 187     
Equitable share 30 541    33 173    37 139    39 789      44 490       50 208       52 869       
Conditional grants 22 821    26 505    30 251    34 268      36 135       39 181       41 094       
General fuel levy sharing with
metropolitan municipalities
7 542      8 573      9 040      9 613        10 190       10 659       11 224       
Non-interest allocations   739 752   813 451 877 374  947 853    1 024 662  1 099 943  1 166 424  
Percentage increase 7.2% 10.0% 7.9% 8.0% 8.1% 7.3% 6.0% 
Debt-service costs 66 227    76 460    88 121    101 256    114 901     126 647     139 201     
Contingency reserve –             –             –             –               3 000         6 000         18 000       
Main budget expenditure   805 979   889 911   965 496  1 049 109   1 142 562   1 232 590  1 323 624 
Percentage increase 7.9% 10.4% 8.5% 8.7% 8.9% 7.9% 7.4% 
Percentage shares
National departments 48.1% 47.0% 47.0% 47.4% 47.8% 47.5% 47.4%
Provinces 43.6% 44.6% 44.2% 43.8% 43.4% 43.4% 43.6%
Local government 8.2% 8.4% 8.7% 8.8% 8.9% 9.1% 9.0%
Provinces spent 
98.1 per cent of their 
budgets; municipalities 
spent 84.6 per cent their 
infrastructure grants  
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